ABSTRACT. Roth (1987) effectively distinguishes Quinean indeterminacy of translation from the more general underdetermination of theories by showing how indeterminacy follows directly from holism and the role of a shared environment in language learning. However, Roth is mistaken in three further consequences he draws from his interpretation of indeterminacy. Contra Roth, natural science and social science are not differentiated as offering theories about the shared environment and theories about meanings respectively; the role of the environment in language learning does not justify an empiricist sense of "objective evidence"; and his advocacy of methodological pluralism does not appropriately sustain the project of social scientific methodology in response to holism and indeterminacy.
electrons or quarks. Just as with physical theory, "the reasons normally given for translating languages one way rather than another are justified simply by their internal coherence, and such practices as translation and ascription of intentional states are justified by their social utility" (1979, p. 194) .
Recently, this reading of the indeterminacy thesis and its relation to other Quinean doctrines has been subjected to powerful criticism by Paul Roth (1987) . Roth argues that the indeterminacy of translation follows directly from Quine's holism and the indispensability of intersubjectively available stimuli for language learning. No appeal to problematic methodological distinctions between science and translation are required. Roth then claims that these considerations, and in particular the crucial role of language learning, vindicate Quine's conclusion that "there are no 'facts of meaning' as there are facts of nature" (p. 19), and that "this failing distinguishes meaning claims relative to a manual of translation in kind from claims that a sentence is true relative to a scientific theory" (p. 8). Against Rorty's thoroughly pragmatist revision of Quine, Roth claims to have vindicated Quine's insistence that an adequate pragmatism is ineliminably empiricist (Quine 1981) .
In the remainder of the book, Roth goes on to argue that the strong version of indeterminacy which this argument supports has important methodological implications for the social sciences. He concludes that there can be no single set of methodological canons or normative assumptions which define the rational pursuit of social inquiry, and advocates an irreducible "methodological pluralism" for the social sciences. He uses this conclusion to undercut various arguments that the social sciences should aim to imitate the methods of natural science, or that they cannot; that epistemology should be replaced by a naturalistic sociology of knowledge; and that there is a substantive issue at stake in the question of whether there exist alternate canons of rationality.
I take Roth to be substantially correct about how one ought to situate the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation with respect to holism, naturalism, and underdetermination (albeit not necessarily about what Quine's own view of the matter is), and I shall offer no further defense of his account here. Instead, my aim in this paper is to criticize several key points which Roth takes to follow from indeterminacy properly regarded. The principal target of my criticism will be the claim that indeterminacy has distinctive importance for the social sciences vis-~t-vis the natural sciences. Roth's position on this issue is subtle, for he agrees with Rorty that there is no methodological difference in kind between natural and social science; to say otherwise would entail an objectionable version of methodological exclusivism for the social sciences. Nevertheless, Roth remains mistakenly committed to the view that the natural sciences and the human sciences have a different epis: temic standing, because of the differences between meaning and truth indicated by Quine's indeterminacy thesis. In working out where Roth goes astray, we shall also discover difficulties in his account of the role of empirical evidence in the sciences, and his own proposal for methodological pluralism. One important result of my arguments will be that Roth's reinterpretation of Quinean indeterminacy is unsuccessful at retaining "the last mooring of empiricism" (p. 53).
Allow me first to recapitulate Roth's interpretation of the indeterminacy thesis and his reconstructed argument for it, emphasizing those aspects which will figure in my own criticisms later. If indeterminacy resulted from a methodological difficulty in choosing between competing manuals of translation, it would be on a par with (and perhaps only a special case of) the underdetermination of all scientific theories. Thus, in place of any methodological argument for indeterminacy, Roth offers a rather different reconstruction of Quine's argument.
The indispensable Quinean premise for this argument is holism, the claim that theoretical sentences acquire meaning and evidence only as part of a theory. Holism by itself, however, leads to what Roth calls the "paradox of language learning":
If we maintain that the sentences accepted as true in both natural language and natural science have their meaning and their evidence only as a related block, then someone with no knowledge of a language (e.g., an infant) should find any single sentence to be meaningless, and so incomprehensible. But children initially learn to speak by learning single sentences. So [it seems] Quine must be wrong in claiming that sentences have significance only within a theoretical context. [p. 21] The appropriate response to this paradox on Roth's view is not to abandon holism, but to find a way to make holism compatible with the evident fact that natural languages can be learned through extensive social interaction in a shared environment. Roth's (and Quine's) way of ach|eving compatibility between holism and the need for languages to be publicly learnable is to claim that there must be "observation sentences" whose usage is established by "shared stimuli to which we respond and around which our use of language is initially coordinated" (Roth, p. 19) . Holism is preserved, because which sentences turn out to be observation sentences (and which observations they are associated with) cannot be specified independently of an assumed theory. That a (learnable) language always contains some such sentences is known only through an argument to the best explanation about the conditions necessary for language learning (p. 22) . No such argument can be constructed, however, to show that the existence of "semantic facts", or of any specifically intentional evidence, is a necessary condition for language learning. Hence, Roth concludes, the epistemological parallel which Rorty and others draw between theories about the publicly available world and theories about meanings cannot be sustained. We have strong reason to believe that there is a fact of the matter (however underdetermined) underlying the one, and no such reasons in the case of the other. Indeed, Roth's claim is stronger than this rendition suggests, for he thinks there is an "in principle" cast to the argument provided by the fact that, given our understanding of how language is learned, no additional evidence suffices to make meaning realism plausible. Rather, meaning realism requires wholesale revisions in our beliefs about language acquisition. (p. 20) Had Roth stopped here, claiming only that the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is independent of and stronger than the thesis that theories are evidentially underdetermined, and that indeterminacy in this strong sense renders untenable any doctrine of meaning realism, there would be no dispute between us. Unfortunately, Roth goes on to gloss this account of indeterminacy with three further claims, which I believe to be untenable. The first two together constitute the element of empiricism which Roth thinks Quine's arguments make inescapable. They are:
(1) (2) the difference between theories about the publicly available world, and theories about meanings, conforms to the difference between the natural and social sciences ("Natural science is about this intersubjective domain [that provides the basis for language acquisition]. Hence theories in natural science posit a fact of the matter" [p. 19] .); the necessity of intersubjective stimuli for language learning warrants a belief in objective evidence (at least within the domain of natural science) that is more than just a matter of social agreement;
The third claim is Roth's meta-methodological reflection on the consequences of his reconstructed Quineanism:
the appropriate response to holism and indeterminacy is not to abandon the projects of epistemology and/or methodology, but to adopt methodological pluralism.
The place to start is with the difficulties posed by language acquisition and the warrant they supposedly supply to the notion of "objective empirical evidence". Roth rightly notes an apparent conflict between holism and the alleged indeterminacy of translation. Holism commits us to the view that evidence does not bear upon sentences individually, but only collectively. But if so, then it may seem impossible to distinguish (as strong indeterminacy requires) theories about the public world, for which there is supposedly a fact of the matter, and theories about meanings, for which no facts obtain. In choosing one translation over another, we certainly appeal to evidence; indeed, we appeal to the same body of evidence (on Quine's view, sense experience) that supports our theories about the physical world. We cannot restrict the applicability of evidence to physical theory alone without contravening holism. So, Roth notes, "the dilemma is how there can be no facts for a linguistic theory for which we nonetheless have evidence" (p. 46).
Roth responds that at least some sentences must be initially learned, before their interanimation with other sentences can provide the evidential base that Quine ascribes to our "total theory". To learn sentences is to learn how and when to use them. If we cannot presuppose that some other sentences have already been learned and made available to guide further language learning, then the only resource available for interpreting the initially learned sentences must be a publicly available world. And so Roth follows Quine in concluding that some sentences function in language learning as "observation sentences", that is, sentences which one can learn to use more or less correctly based only upon how the surrounding environment shows itself on the occasions of their use.
It is important to recognize first what this argument does not purport to establish. Which sentences are observation sentences (i.e., are cued to the surrounding environment with sufficient directness to function as observation sentences) cannot be picked out independently of a theory. Nor can one identify independently of a particular theory what the evidence is (i.e., what the relevantly similar features of the environment are) which cues the production of observation sentences, or even that it is the same features or aspects of the shared environment to which teachers and learners attend. Being an observation sentence is not a property of the sentence, but of the use of the sentence in various environmental circumstances within a particular social context, and that use itself cannot be explained or described independently of some theory. Roth therefore says that the notion of evidence established by the argument from language learning must be "anontological".
Furthermore, this argument does not establish that there is objective evidence for the truth of any particular sentences. As Roth reminds us, all that remains of empiricism for a Quinean is a theory of evidence, but not a theory of truth. The surrounding environment cannot determine which sentences are true except via the interanimation of sentences, but it can be used to connect sentences (evidentially) to particular (sorts of) stimulations. Thus, Roth points out that [o] bservation sentences are determined internally in the sense that the sentences specified as observational are so specified intratheoretically. But the claim that there are stimulus meanings guiding and directing our use of certain sentences is a claim about what evidence is needed in order to teach a language. (pp. 53-54) We need to explore further what can be meant by calling this argument for the existence of (unidentifiable) observation sentences an account of evidence. Roth himself objects to Quine's project of accounting for the evidential basis for language learning neurophysiologicaily. In naturalizing epistemology, Quine had expressed the hope that evidence would be a physical concept. The "stimulus meaning" of sentences would be explicable by similarity groupings in the perceiver's physical interaction with the world (hence Quine's use of the phrase "surface irritations" to describe the evidential basis of language). But Roth insists that the behavioral dimension of relating language to the world is indispensable (p. 62-72). The point is not that behavioral notions are somehow irreducible in principle to physiological notions, because Quine's holism abolishes the relevant notion of reduction. Rather, an account of stimulation at the neurophysiological level cannot do the requisite epistemological work, i.e., it cannot account for the shared basis for communication. Roth is arguing that Quine's physicalistic notion of evidence is inescapably individualistic, just at the juncture when his epistemology must transcend the individual subject: "the scientific type of explanation [in terms of 'elementary physical states'] is a form of linguistic solipsism" (p. 67). Only a behavioral correlation between the perceived world and what others say and do will suffice to account for the possibility of language learning.
Hence the evidence necessary for language learning is irreducibly social, as Roth himself insists. There is no way, on the Quinean account reconstructed by Roth, to account for the public dimension of language (and hence, knowledge) in terms of the physical interaction between an individual subject and her surrounding environment. Indeed, linguistic behavior may be crucial in constructing a perceptually shared world with respect to which language may be learned. Roth notes that Quine himself recognizes this (without seeming to grasp fully its implications for his epistemology) when he says, [u] naided by language, we might treat a great lot of sensory events as recurrences of one and the same sensation, simply because of a similarity between each event and the next; and yet there can have been a serious cumulative slippage of similarity between the latest of these events and the earliest of them. (Quine 1977, p. 176) .
Reminiscent of Wittgenstein's private language argument, for a Quinean/i la Roth, the criteria for what is similar and what is different in our perceptions are provided by behavioral correlations with others, which include their verbal behavior. Even the public environment with respect to which we can first learn a language need not be available to us prelinguistically.
It is not enough to say, however, as Roth does, that the correlation between utterances and world involved in language learning is irreducibly social and behavioral. Language learning is a form of social interaction which does not occur between social equals. The occupant(s) of one social role ("teacher") is(are), within the context of language acquisition, authoritative. There is no publicly available check on the correctness overall of the teachers' utterances (it is important here that the role of the teacher is filled collectively by those whose speech the learner seeks to master for herself). Teachers speak in the presence of the learner, and correct the learner's utterances on various occasions. The learner gradually adapts her own utterances to conform to the open-ended collection of available models of correct use and corrections of her own incorrect use. Now the fact which Roth (and Quine) are concerned to explain is how the learner ever gets beyond this unequal role, such that she can herself generally succeed in making utterances that are themselves taken as first correct, then eventually equally authoritative with those of her teachers. And the explanation that is offered is that "a public and shared sense of the environment" (p. 57) or, in Quine's preferred terms, a body of sufficiently similar stimulations is available as an initial entry point into language, after which the interanimation of sentences can take over. This argument is supposed to establish indeterminacy in its strong Quinean form, because semantics has no such publicly available resource to appeal to. Teachers and learners alike can appeal to a surrounding world for cues and clues for the use of sentences, in a way they cannot appeal to meanings.
The recognition of the social and epistemic inequality of the language learning situation shows the first difficulty with Roth's notion of objective evidence. He takes the argument that holism and language learning presuppose a shared opening onto the world as an inference to the best explanation of the fact that languages are in fact learned. But this misconstrues the nature of the argument. An argument to the best explanation begins with a fact in need of explanation, and posits some other matter of fact which we are warranted in believing to account for the original explanandum. Now the "fact" which is supposed to be explained by Roth's argument is the success of language learning, i.e., that the learner succeeds in speaking a language given finite behavioral cues to correct and incorrect use. And from the point of view of the learner, this is what needs explaining, because without sufficient environmental cues, the language would always be incomprehensible to her.
From the socially authoritative view of the teacher(s), however, the question is significantly altered. For the teacher, that the language is being learned is not a given. A language speaker is one who no longer merely imitates the sounds or marks produced by others, but speaks in her own right. In an older idiom, we would say she produces those sounds or marks meaningfully. But it is precisely this about which Quine insists there is no fact of the matter, and hence nothing to be explained in the usual scientific manner. The point is not that no distinction can be made between speakers and imitators, for we do this quite readily. Rather, it is that this distinction is not an independent explanandum, for which the explanans is to be the shared environment which cues observation sentences. The ability to correlate another's utterances to a shared environment is constitutive of her counting as a speaker. And this suggests that the argument is not an inference to the best explanation, which warrants belief in "objective evidence" as a matter of fact, but a transcendental argument about the necessary conditions for marks and sounds counting as utterances within a language. 1
The force of this difference can be seen by considering what view Roth's argument is directed against. Roth is concerned to vindicate Quine's insistence upon the role of objective evidence in justification, against the claim he attributes to Rorty that "evidence, in the guise of observation sentences, is what the community of scientists currently accept on this score, [so that] observation sentences are a purely sociological phenomenon [and] internal coherence [is] the only constraint on the warranting of beliefs" (p. 55). Roth is right to reject this claim (whether or not it is correctly attributable to Rorty), but this does not vindicate his presumption that to reject it is to warrant some strong sense of objective evidence. We should by now have learned to be suspicious about the distinction, "either based upon objective evidence or else just a matter of coherence or consensus." There is indeed no evidence for our beliefs apart from social practices of justification and the norms which are established and sustained within them; but there are no social practices without language use sustained by continuing reference to a shared environment. Are we able to learn a language because we appeal to the objective evidence of a shared world, or does the notion of evidence simply drop out in favor of a consensus on which sentences to accept? The question is confused. Social practice and public world are inextricable, and this is what Roth's argument from the conditions for language learning should once again teach us. He has shown not that there "really" is evidence which provides objective warrant to social consensus on matters of justification, any more than Davidson (1984) showed that we really do have most of our beliefs about the world in common with other language speakers. In both cases, the ability to correlate utterances and surrounding world is constitutive of their being utterances at all.
These reflections on the argument from language learning and the significance of empirical evidence lead us directly to the central issue of my paper, which is the implications of Roth's account of indeterminacy for the epistemic standing of the natural and social sciences. The availability of objective evidence provides the basis for what remains for Roth of a distinction in kind between the natural and the social sciences. He equates the domain of the natural sciences with the realm of evidence whose existence is shown by the argument from language learning: "Natural science is about this intersubjective, public domain. Hence theories in natural science posit a fact of the matter (the ontology of a theory) by way of explaining the intersubjectively available evidence that provides the basis for language acquisition" (p. 19). By contrast, the evidential basis for the social sciences is up for grabs; no argument is available to restrict the social sciences to accounting for a specific body of evidence.
This interpretation of the epistemic significance of the evidence required for language learning displays an important feature of Roth's account of Quinean indeterminacy of translation. Roth regularly contrasts theories in the natural sciences to semantic theories, as theories about two different sorts of domain, one of which contains matters of fact while the other does not. Meaning remains an unfilled object domain, instead of ceasing to be an objective domain at all. "Physical object" and "semantic object" remain contrast classes, and indeterminacy specifically concerns theories about meanings as opposed to theories about objects. The latter, in turn, are identified specifically with the epistemic target of the natural sciences.
What is the alternative to this interpretation of the indeterminacy of translation as the emptying of the object domain of semantics? It is to see indeterminacy as a thesis about the meaningfulness of any and all language use. All theories are holistically connected to the public world through social practice, without any intermediary "meanings" which fix how the connection is to be made. Fact and meaning are not separate epistemic domains, but aspects of every significant utterance in any epistemic domain.
The difficulties with Roth's juxtaposition of the domains of physical and semantic theories can be seen to arise on both sides of the alleged contrast. First, I will argue that the need for some fairly direct connection between language and world in order to overcome the paradox of language learning does not provide us with a body of evidence, or a domain of content, which is in any way fixed by reference to the surrounding world. Hence, it provides no distinct subject matter for the natural sciences as opposed to other disciplines. Then I will show that meaning, the focus of indeterminacy in Roth's and Quine's strong sense, cannot be localized. Indeterminacy pervades all discourse, in-cluding that about the surrounding environment. The indeterminacy thesis can thus be represented as the claim that there is nothing unlanguage-like "behind" language use which can fix its meaning or reference. Once we have learned what speakers are inclined to say (itself, of course, an inexhaustible enterprise), there is no further ground for interpretation. Even who counts as competent speakers is at issue, as we have seen in the discussion of language learning. There is no fact of the matter about who is a competent speaker of language, beyond determining whom other speakers (themselves of contestable identity) will recognize as competent speakers.
Consider first the question of whether the evidence which Roth claims is a necessary condition for language learning can be taken as a specifiable domain with a content. The argument from language learning turned out to be a transcendental argument, which shows that there must be some sentences learnable more or less directly from shared environmental cues. As Roth himself takes pains to point out, this argument provides no basis for identifying either the observation sentences of a language or the features of the environment which cue them. Nor is there any ground for the claim that teachers and learners must attend to the same environmental features in cuing observation sentences; it may turn out that the best translations of the learner's observation sentences into the teachers' idiolect are not homophonic with the teachers' utterances which provided her with behavioral clues for learning those sentences.
Quine thought he fixed the meaning of observation sentences (at least relative to physical theory) by treating the evidential basis of language learning to be physiological. Stimulus meaning was a way of correlating at least some fragments of language with events determinate independently of language. Roth has shown why this will not do; only a behavioral correlation between sentences and speakers'/learners' responses to environmental cues will provide the requisite shared basis for linguistic response.
But behavioral correlations must be interpreted, and indeterminacy is ineliminable from such interpretation. Any doubts that it calls forth indeterminacy can be removed by considering a behavioral correlate to what Steve Fuller (1988, chapter 6) has called "the inscrutability of silence". Utterances and behavior in the context of language acquisition are highly contextual, and Gricean "conversational" considerations (Grice 1988 ) must play a significant role in the interpretation of both teacher's and learner's behavior. After all, one cannot presume a prior grasp of a common stock of meanings, since this is precisely what the learner lacks and desires access to. Thus, teacher and learner rely upon interaction with salient features of the surrounding environment, past patterns of interaction, and the practical exigencies of the situation to orient the learner into language. But the language learner attempting to correlate her teachers' utterances and behavior with their shared environment must not only take account of what the teachers overtly say and do, but also of what they do not do. The learner must decide which behavioral omissions mark an expectation that the salience and relevance of an environmental feature is so obvious as to need no further attention drawn to it, and which omissions display an insensitivity to or a discounting of its significance. There are thus behavioral and environmental parallels to the Gricean Maxim of Quantity: all that is done (to help the learner understand the contextual cues for an indicated word use) needs to be done. The moral is that behavioral correlations do not provide a specifiable body of evidence which can fix linguistic interpretation; so the evidence grounding language acquisition has no fixed content. Even in the case of observation sentences, teachers and learners do not have to agree about the correlations to be made between sentences and stimuli; they only need an environment in which they can come to agree that they agree.
We can now see how Roth's adoption of Quine's term "evidence", with its empiricist overtones, is misleading as a description of the availability of a shared environment which is the necessary context of language acquisition. Evidence in the empiricist sense must be a determinate content which can be made present to a knower. Something (whether surface irritations, sense-data, or perceptually manifest physical objects) serves as determinate evidence for something else. Roth's argument establishes no such thing, for the relevant content is indeterminate even relative to any physical theory (whose own indeterminacy is for rhetorical purposes ignored). If a notion of "evidence" is appropriate here at all, it would be that which occurs most clearly in Heidegger (1962; , essays III, V, X): language acquisition would not be possible unless a shared world (or "clearing", "opening", etc.) manifests itself, makes itself evident. This would not be evidence for anything, but only the evidence of a common world. And "world" in this sense is a field or context within which particular things can show up, but which cannot itself be a determinate item within that context. 2
The residual empiricism which Roth has not eliminated from his account of indeterminacy can be seen to be problematic in another way when we remember that the evidence necessary for language acquisition is supposed to be co-extensive with the evidence for natural scientific theories. This is doubly problematic, for it unduly restricts the interpretation of the evidence underlying language acquisition, and implausibly restricts the aims of the natural sciences. Consider first the evidence underlying language acquisition. The unargued presupposition with which Roth presents us is that the evidence of our shared environment underlying language learning is appropriately describable (or at least explainable) in the terms of the natural sciences. Now we have already seen that, on Roth's own account, this evidence may itself be partially constituted through linguistic behavior (i.e., the willingness of language speakers to use the same word in various circumstances may be a constitutive feature of the perceptual similarity of those circumstances). But the "non-natural" aspects of that evidence may go much deeper, such that the shared phenomena which cue language acquisition would seem quite remote from the domain of the natural sciences. For example, the observation sentences through which some speakers enter into language may concern the moods conveyed by their surroundings: once evidence is freed from the empiricist constraints of physical surface irritations, cheerfulness, sadness, or menace seem to be as readily available to the observant child as colors, shapes, or movement, and perhaps more so. As Roth himself points out, neither the sentences which actually function as observation sentences nor the observations which cue them can be identified without reference to a theory. So a dilemma confronts Roth's claim that the shared environment which resolves the paradox of language learning provides the evidence base for natural science. Either the natural sciences include such phenomena as moods within their domain of explanation, or else a theory of linguistic development which posited moods as the proximate referents of first language would be ruled out in advance, contra Roth's pragmatic pluralism. Neither alternative seems acceptable.
There are also undoubtedly alternative ways of construing the evidence for language acquisition to be other than grist for the mill of physical theory. The salient features of a shared environment might be neither objects nor sensory qualities, but rather purposive complexes of equipment. The child's first utterance of 'car' could well denote not a physical object, but rather its connectedness with travelling and various significant possible destinations (granny's house, the doctor, the market). The best translation of the child's 'bottle' might be the emotional/physical ambiance of feeding, such that the child's implied request would not be appropriately met by providing her an empty bottle, a bottle filled with cold milk, or by failing to hold her while she eats) Yet no one would want to say that the purposive links between equipment, social practices, and the satisfactions they can produce provide the objective evidence for which natural science is to account. So even if there were a determinate content to evidence in Roth's Quinean sense, there seems little reason to confine that content to what might be plausibly accounted for by natural science as we know it, let alone that it belongs to "a notion of evidence satisfying the tenets of empiricism" (p. 41). Roth's pragmatism and pluralism are contravened by his residual empiricism, and the force of his arguments suggest that it is clearly the empiricism which must be abandoned.
Comparable problems also arise from the other side of Roth's claim. There is a serious ambiguity in Roth's claim that "natural science is about this intersubjective, public domain [of evidence for language acquisition]" (p. 19). He could mean that the historically evolving practices which we identify collectively as the natural sciences have de facto aimed to account for precisely those intersubjective stimuli which have provided the initial focus of language acquisition. Alternatively, the claim could be that in order to count as a science of nature, a discipline must at least putatively account for those same stimuli. Neither version is attractive. The latter seems both arbitrary and contrary to Roth's Quinean pragmatism. How could and why should the meaning and reference of "natural science" be fixed prior to the actual unfolding of scientific inquiry? What "first philosophy" could possibly accomplish this, given holism and indeterminacy?
But the former option seems little better. The evolving history of the natural sciences has seen substantial change in its evidential base. The phenomena which the natural sciences most proximally aim to explain are increasingly remote from the sorts of observations which could cue language acquisition, not only due to the increasing importance and complexity of theory (for which everyday evidence might still offer Quinean boundary conditions), but also because the phenomena which are of scientific interest are complex, skillful constructions (Hacking 1983, part II) . The natural sciences undoubtedly offer rich resources for creating plausible stories about how our everyday environment impacts us, but scientists generally do not provide more rigorous treatment of such matters, and certainly would not take it to be the ground or measure of the sciences' epistemic enterprise. I thus conclude: even if Roth were to succeed (against my earlier arguments) in assigning a determinate content to the evidence needed for language acquisition, there are no plausible grounds for identifying that content as the evidential domain of the natural sciences.
So far I have been arguing against one side of Roth's conceptualization of the significance of indeterminacy in terms of the differing domains of physical theory and semantics. I claim to have shown so far that Roth's argument from language acquisition neither establishes a determinate domain of objective evidence, nor provides special evidential warrant for or constraint upon the natural sciences. I now turn to the question of whether semantics can be appropriately regarded as a contrast domain to that of physical theory, albeit one which indeterminacy of translation shows to be empty of any fact of the matter.
Why would one ever think that "meaning" demarcates an epistemic domain to be distinguished from that of our surrounding (natural) environment? This suggestion has been prominent within the philosophy of the social sciences, in accounts of why the study of human beings must be methodologically different from the study of nature. Thus, Wittgensteinians like Peter Winch, or hermeneuticists such as Charles Taylor or Hubert Dreyfus, have urged that understanding human agents involves grasping the meaning which informs their actions and institutions. Meanings are allegedly embodied in semantic rules or practical skills, which must be interpreted, and which are not susceptible to natural scientific explanation. So the human sciences are concerned to account for the domain of meaningful activity, while the natural sciences account for the brute, meaningless processes of the physical world.
Roth provides a trenchant criticism of this strategy for understanding social science and prescribing its methodology. Focusing primarily upon Winch and Martin Hollis, Roth shows how their apparently contrasting views of rationality each presuppose an unwarranted "meaning realism", which "asserts that the meaning of words is fixed by virtue of some special relation, whether this special relation be to rules or concepts, or to objects in the world" (p. 151). Meaning realism in any form is made untenable by Roth's argument for Quinean indeterminacy of translation. Roth concludes from this that "any purported problem that makes realist assumptions with regard to meaning or a priori standards of rationality constitutes a pseudoproblem in social science" (p. 151). What Roth does not recognize, however, is that meaning realism is an assumption not limited to the philosophy of social science, and that indeterminacy of translation undercuts various interpretations of natural scientific knowledge in a similar way.
Appeals to meaning realism in the natural sciences can most easily be seen in the case of the family of views called "scientific realism". Contemporary realists like Richard Boyd (1984) recognize the epistemological significance of Quinean holism for the natural sciences in undercutting any straightforward empirical foundationalism. Boyd, however, tries to turn holism into a premise of an indirect argument for realism about the referents of successful scientific theories. According to Boyd, the theory-dependence of scientific methods, including empirical confirmation, makes it highly unlikely that those methods could be systematically successful in coping with the world around us (the shared environment which Roth argues is presupposed by the phenomenon of language learning), unless the theories which sustain those methods were at least approximately true. Boyd's explanatory project demands a strong correspondence sense of truth. There must be a fact of the matter about how the world is, independent of our beliefs, norms, and practices, which accounts for our epistemic and technical success. There must also be a fact of the matter about whether the relation of correspondence holds (at least approximately) between scientific theories and the facts about the world; otherwise, the correspondence relation would not be explanatory. But this could not be the case unless there were also a fact of the matter about what our theories say the world is like. Scientific realism is committed to meaning realism about the claims of natural science.
The connection between scientific realism and meaning realism is often obscured by realists' objections to Fregean accounts of meanings as determining reference. But the realist alternative to the Fregean treatment is a causal account of reference. We are able to retranslate, say, J. J. Thomson's claims about (supposedly hard, determinate, particulate) electrons into claims (some true, some false) about quantum mechanical entities, because there is a determinate cause to the phenomena Thomson was investigating. The realist charitably interprets Thomson to refer to whatever really caused (most of) the phenomena he studied. But this project cannot intelligibly go through unless at a minimum the meaning of 'cause' is determinate, fixed by the interactions of the objects really present in Thomson's experimental setup. The realist cannot, that is, treat "cause" in the same way as "electron", as referring to whatever (really) caused our interactions with things which we first labelled as causes. The meaning of 'cause' as the scientific realist uses it must be fixed by what it really means to be causally interactive. 4 Those who believe that meaning realism and scientific realism about the entities of physics are logically independent views do so because they believe, as Roth does, that intentional "entities" and physical entities compose two distinct domains of possibly extant objects, towards which different epistemic commitments might well be possible. But our reflections upon realism about physical objects shows why this is not so: one cannot intelligibly be a realist about physical objects in the strong sense proposed by someone like Boyd, without being a realist about at least some meanings. Meaning and intentionality are not a localizable epistemic domain, but rather the condition for any possible interaction with things (including knowledge). The scientific realist employing a causal account of reference shows this point especially clearly precisely by trying to avoid commitment to meaning realism, but failing in the crucial case of "cause" itself. I submit that any other way of sustaining a correspondence realism about physical entities would encounter the same problem somewhere. The meanings of the terms of physical theories must be fixed in some way in order for the realist's correspondence theory of truth to make any sense at all, in asserting the correspondence between theory and world to be a factual matter.
Roth's own argument against Quine's version of naturalized epistemology is also ironically telling against the idea that meaning realism is a view of relevance only to the domain of the social sciences. What Roth's argument shows is that Quine holds to an objectionable meaning realism in accounting for natural scientific knowledge. We need quickly to recall what aspect of Quine's view is at issue, and how Roth construes his own objections to it. Quine is committed to a scientific explanation of the possibility of scientific knowledge. On Quine's view, Roth points out,
[n]atural science, in order to fulfill its promise as epistemology, must enlighten us with regard to how people make shared sense of the world and the language used to discuss it .... It is the stimulus meaning [of observation sentences] that provides the causal connection between language and the world. Yet, if what science seeks is to understand this causal connection as a basis for warranted belief, then what needs explaining is how people are stimulated the same. (Roth, p. 60 ).
Quine insists that this explanation must ultimately be provided at the level of neurophysiology, or what Roth calls "receptual similarity", since this is the most fundamental relevant level of physical science.
Roth's counterargument, as we have seen, is that the necessarily social basis for knowledge can never be provided at the neurophysiological level, because the "surface irritations" through which the environment physically impacts us are different for different individuals (who occupy different locations within the environment, and possess physically different receptors). But knowledge (including language acquisition) requires shared references with which to correlate the utterance of observation sentences. In order to mediate these differences in individuals' physical reception of stimuli, the epistemologist must appeal to behavioral similarities, i.e., correlations of what people say and do, with what can be seen going on around them. Only thus can we account for what Quine calls differences in "salience", i.e., differences in perceivers' similarity groupings. So Roth concludes that "the behavioral level of explanation is as fine-grained as can be hoped for when it comes to asking for an analysis of people's shared basis of knowledge of the world" (p. 66).
In proposing this modification of Quine's naturalized epistemology in this way, Roth claims "to surrender none of his critical theses and none of his empiricist tenets" (p. 72). A little reflection shows this to be somewhat disingenuous. What Roth has shown is that Quine's epistemology naturalized is another unsuccessful attempt to "assert that the meaning of words is fixed by virtue of some special relation to objects in the world" (p. 151), viz., to physical similarities in reception. Roth claims to remain true to Quine's empiricism in his behavioral turn, because he takes behavior, including differential perceptual responses to the surrounding environment, to be matter of fact in the same way Quine took neurophysiology to be. It must have a determinate content; put another way, there must be a fact of the matter about what we are doing when we respond to what goes on around us.
But behavior is not matter of fact in this way. Remember that the behavior relevant to establishing correlations between perceptual simi-larities and behavioral responses includes not just what we overtly do, but what we do not do, and do not respond to. And what is not done and not noticed does not comprise a domain of "facts" or determinate evidence. My suggested behavioral version of FuUer's argument for the inscrutability of silence was a way of recognizing that indeterminacy of translation pervades the interpretation of behavior underlying language acquisition. The conclusion to be drawn can be stated two ways. One is to restate the earlier conclusion that Roth's argument from language acquisition does not justify the claim that there is a determinate body of evidence about the world, only that there must be a shared opening onto a world whose configuration is indeterminate except relative to translation into a background language. The other way to state the conclusion is that what Roth found objectionable in Quine's epistemology is really its attempt to fix the stimulus meaning of observation sentences by a relation to events whose interpretation is not subject to indeterminacy. Quine's proposed physical science of science is objectionably meaning realist, and meaning realism is thus not just a view about a limited epistemic domain.
What implications do these arguments have for Roth's own proposed methodological pluralism for the social sciences? Pluralism is first and foremost a negative thesis, the denial that we can make sense of there being "one proper set of rules" for studying human behavior (p. 6). Nothing in my argument undercuts Roth's powerful criticisms of various forms of methodological exclusivism, not even by significantly altering what is objectionable about broadly positivistic approaches to the social sciences (including the allegedly postpositivist quest for paradigms), impossibility arguments about social science (e.g., Winch), or the strong program in sociology of knowledge. If anything, the critical implications he finds in Quinean indeterminacy are shown to apply more broadly.
What about the positive program expressed by methodological pluralism? Roth seems to be making two basic claims. He follows Quine and Feyerabend in "remaining convinced that there is something to be said concerning how inquiry may best proceed even after the demise of traditional epistemology", where what is to be said "embodies a concern to explain, and presumably advance, the achievements of science" (p. 74ff). The contrast is supposed to be to Rorty, who "denies that such speculation serves any positive'purpose [and] maintains that such philosophizing only fosters dehumanization" (p. 98). The second claim follows up on this, by insisting that the problem which thoughtful individuals are now faced with respect to the notion of rationality is precisely the problem Mill develops with respect to perpetuating liberty in a society, namely the question of how to balance constraint and experimentation. [ My arguments against Roth's account of the implications of indeterminacy in no way challenge this second claim, or even its connection to Quinean epistemology. They only serve to broaden Roth's account, to encompass rational inquiry in the natural sciences within the scope of his linkage of epistemology to moral and political inquiry. 5 With respect to his first claim, my arguments serve primarily to soften the contrast he wants to maintain between Rorty and Quine or Feyerabend, by loosening the sense of "methodology" which figures in Roth's methodological pluralism. Roth puts the supposed contrast succinctly:
Quine and Feyerabend surrender any belief in truth as correspondence and yet retain an interest in perpetuating inquiry. Rorty, for his part, believes that if you give up truth as correspondence, then it is simply a case of bad faith to insist that "success" and "method" are still worth pondering about. (p. 105) But there is a difference between having no concern about how best to advance inquiry, and insisting as Rorty does that reflections on how to do so must eschew anything resembling the notion of "method". If the notion of "method" is to retain any interesting content, it cannot simply be identical to any and every concern for how to advance inquiry (where what would count as an advance might still be under dispute). 6 Roth ironically cites with approval Rorty's claim that advocates of Verstehen in the social sciences take civility as a methodological strategy. But civility is not a method, it is simply a virtue. (Rorty 1983, p. 169; cited in Roth, p. 110) .
I say his approval is ironic, because this passage explains why Rorty might reasonably object to even the residual notion of method in Roth's appeal to pluralism. Rorty might well suggest that what Roth finds left to be said about inquiry after the death of epistemology is similarly to mistake the virtues of tolerance and phronesis for methodology.
Roth would likely accept happily the suggestion that his recommendation of pluralism in this way further blurs the difference between morals and epistemology. But I suspect he still wants to hold onto a residual notion of method, in order to hold off both Rorty and the sociologists of knowledge from claiming that there is nothing left to rationality or evidence but what groups of people contingently come to accept. If I am right, then Roth's insistence upon methodological pluralism is a last vestige of the "Rationalitiitstreit" which he otherwise so consistently undercuts. Roth coined this word to denote the conflict between those who "view the term 'rational' as denoting forms of reasoning which are independent of the vagaries of cultural practices" and those who "take the term 'rational' as an honorific label bestowed by people upon their favored fashion of reasoning" (p. 3). And the last remnant of it is Roth's continuing worry about the difference between "based on evidence and a concern for the success of inquiry", and "merely conversational, the result of consensus". If so, then his worry is misplaced, for what Roth's interpretation of the indeterminacy of translation should have shown us is that we cannot have one of these alternatives without the other. Roth has convincingly interpreted Quine as showing that conversation and consensus can only be achieved via persons' mutual interaction with a shared environment: it is unintelligible to regard inquiry and its products as "merely social", unconstrained by the world. Yet it is also unacceptable to take that shared environment as securing a domain of "objective evidence" in any sense which would escape negotiation: the identification of evidence within that shared environment, along with its employment for the sake of furthering the practices of inquiry, is an ineliminably social activity which cannot be fixed by any determinate fact of the matter, whether physiological or behavioral. 1 The reader may note that this interpretation brings Roth's argument about the necessary conditions for language learning very close to Davidson's argument (1984, essay 13 ) about translatability into a language being a necessary condition for a speaker's utterances counting as linguistic. Nor should this be surprising; our criteria for determining whether a child has successfully learned a language are whether we can successfully translate her utterances (perhaps homophonically) into sentences in our own idiom. 2 Mark Okrent (1988) gives an unusually clear account of Heidegger's notion of evidence, and its connection to more widely known empiricist and phenomenological conceptions; see chapter 4 especially.
3 Mark Okrent (1988, chapters 4-5) has actually developed an extended argument, consistent with Roth's Quinean holism and behaviorism, to the effect that the evidence needed to make possible the understanding (and hence the acquisition) of language is evidence of purposiveness in a context of practical activity, i.e., of what various tools are to be used for and how they are to be used. This example, therefore, goes well beyond merely imagining possible ways in which a shared environment could successfully cue language acquisition in the face of Roth's paradox. 4 A more extensive account of how scientific realism is inextricably bound up with meaning realism is developed by Joseph Rouse (1987, Chapter 5) . 5 I have argued extensively elsewhere (Rouse 1987) for explicitly blurring the bounds between the philosophy of natural science and political thought.
